China’s Gallium and Germanium Pause Lapses November 27: A Contract-by-Contract Exposure Sheet for Buyers
China’s one-year suspension of its US-specific ban on gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard materials runs out on November 27, 2026, and as of November 20 we have found no notice extending it (MOFCOM Announcement No. 72 of 2025). If nothing appears, licence applications for US-bound shipments of those materials go back to being “in principle” refused, and US-bound graphite goes back to stricter end-user review (Announcement No. 46 of 2024). The worldwide licence requirement and the ban on US military end users never paused, so the lapse changes one thing, which is whether a licence naming a US end user gets approved. Your exposure therefore sits in your contracts: where the material is when it leaves China, whose name is on the end-user certificate, and what your force majeure and licence clauses say happens when that licence is refused.
What exactly lapses on November 27, and what stays in force either way?
Only Article 2 of Announcement No. 46 comes back. That is the sentence saying exports to the United States of gallium, germanium, antimony and superhard-material dual-use items will “in principle not be licensed”, plus the stricter end-user and end-use review for US-bound graphite. Announcement No. 72 suspended exactly that article “from today until 27 November 2026”, and nothing else.
Everything around it was never paused, which is why “the ban is back” headlines overstate the change and “it’s only a ban on paper” understates it.
| Layer | Instrument | Status on November 28 if nothing is announced | What it means for a buyer |
|---|---|---|---|
| Licence needed for every gallium and germanium export, any destination | Announcement No. 23 of 2023, in force since 1 Aug 2023 | Unchanged | Your supplier already needs a licence per shipment. That never stopped |
| Licence needed for antimony and listed superhard items, any destination | Announcement No. 33 of 2024, in force since 15 Sep 2024 | Unchanged | Same, for antimony |
| No dual-use exports to US military users or military end uses | Announcement No. 46, Article 1 | Unchanged, never suspended | Defense programs were never covered by the pause |
| US-bound gallium, germanium, antimony, superhard: “in principle not licensed”; US-bound graphite: stricter review | Announcement No. 46, Article 2 | Back in force | Applications naming a US end user revert to a presumption of denial |
| Anyone anywhere who transfers these China-origin items to US organisations “in violation of the above” faces legal liability | Announcement No. 46, closing paragraph | Reach widens again once Article 2 is back | Third-country traders reselling Chinese material into the US are on notice |
| October 2025 package (more rare earths, the 0.1% foreign-product rule, batteries and anodes, wider superhard list) | Nos. 55-58, 61, 62 of 2025 | Still suspended, to 10 Jan 2027 (Announcement No. 58 of 2026) | A separate clock. Do not confuse it with this one |
Translations of the Chinese-language MOFCOM and State Council texts quoted in this post are ours.
The date itself needs care. The suspension runs “至2026年11月27日”, which we read as inclusive, so the presumption of denial applies from 28 November Beijing time. Midnight in Beijing is 11:00 a.m. Eastern on Friday the 27th, the day after US Thanksgiving, when a lot of US procurement and trade-compliance desks will be out. We have not found a second source that states the hour, so check that reading with your broker or counsel.
Hasn’t the truce already been extended to January 10?
Part of it has, and this date was left out. On 9 November MOFCOM and Customs issued Announcement No. 58 of 2026, keeping six October 2025 control announcements suspended from 11 November 2026 to 10 January 2027. It names Nos. 55, 56, 57, 58, 61 and 62 of 2025. It does not name No. 72, and as of November 20 we have found no separate notice that does.
The political cover is thinner than it looks. MOFCOM’s 28 September read-out of the eighth round of talks said both sides agreed to extend the Kuala Lumpur joint arrangement to 10 January 2027, and described that arrangement as suspending “certain tariff and non-tariff measures” until 10 November 2026. It never mentions 27 November. Then the Trump-Xi meetings at APEC in Shenzhen on 18 and 19 November ended, in Yahoo Finance’s account, with no apparent agreement on extending the truce, and with US officials still complaining that rare earths were not arriving at the pace promised.
Days before the summit, the US Commerce Department released interim rules limiting Chinese firms’ access to advanced computing through overseas data centres, and China’s foreign ministry said it would take “necessary measures”, TNW reported citing Bloomberg. The same report makes the obvious point that Beijing could restore the gallium ban simply by doing nothing.
Last year’s pattern was that suspension notices arrived at the last minute, and No. 72 itself came out two days after the rare-earth suspension. A late notice is plausible. We would not plan on it, because the cost of being ready when it does not arrive is a few days of work, and the cost of not being ready is a line stoppage in January.
Which materials and forms are actually on the lists?
The lists are narrower than “gallium, germanium and antimony” suggests, and they name forms, not end products. This is the first screen every buyer should run, at the customs-code level, before anyone touches a contract. It is the same lesson as the Section 338 Canada tariff, where screening by product family missed most of the real exposure.
| Material | Forms listed in the licensing announcement (reference Chinese customs codes in the source) | Not named, so check before assuming you are exposed |
|---|---|---|
| Gallium (Ann. 23 of 2023) | Gallium metal; gallium nitride, oxide, phosphide, arsenide, selenide and antimonide, including wafers, epitaxial wafers, powder and scrap; indium gallium arsenide | Packaged devices (GaN power transistors, RF modules, LEDs) are not on the list as such. A bare wafer or epi wafer is |
| Germanium (Ann. 23 of 2023) | Germanium metal (crystals, powder, scrap); zone-refined ingots; zinc germanium phosphide; germanium epitaxial substrates; germanium dioxide; germanium tetrachloride | Fibre preforms and finished IR lens assemblies are not named. Germanium crystal blanks may fall under “metal, including crystals”, so check with your broker how yours are declared |
| Antimony (Ann. 33 of 2024) | Antimony ore and raw material; antimony metal in any form (ingot, bead, powder); antimony oxides at purity of 99.99% or above; organic antimony compounds and antimony hydride above 99.999%; indium antimonide crystal; gold-antimony smelting technology | Antimony oxide below 99.99% purity is outside the oxide line. Check the purity grade on your antimony trioxide spec. If it is below 4N, your exposure runs upstream, through the metal. |
| Superhard materials (Ann. 33 of 2024) | Large cubic presses (cylinder bore 500 mm or more, or design pressure 5 GPa or more) and key parts; MPCVD diamond equipment above 10 kW; diamond window material 3 inches and up with visible transmittance of 65% or more; press-synthesis process technology | Diamond micropowder, wire saws and grinding wheels sit in the October 2025 package (No. 55), suspended separately to 10 January |
| Graphite (US-bound, stricter review) | The graphite dual-use items already under licence | The 27 November change is stricter review, not a presumption of denial |
The finished-goods column is where we expect the most confusion. A GaN charger assembled in Shenzhen is not gallium metal or a gallium nitride wafer. A die shipped as a bare chip on a wafer is much closer to it. Ask your supplier what customs code each line actually leaves China under, in writing, and screen that against the announcement’s reference codes.
Which of our contracts are exposed if the pause lapses?
Sort every open contract or PO that touches these materials into one of the rows below. The test is never what the material is called in the contract. It is whether a Chinese export licence naming a US end user still has to be granted after 27 November for the goods to reach you.
Exposure sheet: contract type by what the lapse does to it
| Contract type | Where the material is on Nov 28 | Exposure to the lapse | Default move this week | Skip it when |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spot PO or blanket PO placed directly with a Chinese producer, US delivery | In China, waiting for a licence or a sailing | Highest. Any licence not yet granted goes back to a presumption of denial | Ask the supplier, in writing, for each shipment’s licence number, issue date, validity, the end user it names, and quantity remaining. Ship everything already licensed before the 27th | The goods have already been released by Chinese customs |
| Annual or multi-year frame agreement with monthly call-offs from a Chinese producer | Future call-offs, mostly not yet licensed | High, and slow to show. A single licence covers one export to one end user and lasts at most a year | Map every 2027 call-off to a named licence. Ask whether the supplier holds a general licence (up to three years, multiple shipments) naming you | Every 2027 release already sits under a general licence that names your site. Still ask the next question in this list |
| Consignment or VMI stock held in China, in a bonded or supplier warehouse | In China, even if title is already yours | High. Title does not matter. The export does | Pull it out under an existing licence before the 27th, or re-plan it for a non-US plant | It was always destined for a plant outside the US |
| Third-country trader or distributor (Japan, Korea, Germany, Vietnam, Malaysia) selling material of Chinese origin into the US | Often already outside China | Medium to high, and murky. Announcement No. 46’s closing paragraph makes onward transfer to US organisations a liability for the trader | Ask the origin of what they ship you, and whether their own end-user commitment to MOFCOM allows onward sale to a US buyer. Expect either a refusal or a premium | The trader can show non-Chinese origin with mill or refinery certificates |
| US distributor stock already imported | In the United States | Low on legality, high on price. Chinese export control has already been satisfied for these goods | Lock price and allocation for Q1 now, before distributors re-price | Your contract price is already fixed through Q1 |
| Non-Chinese wafer, epi or optics supplier using Chinese feedstock (for example a GaAs wafer maker in Japan) | Feedstock is in their supply chain, not yours | Indirect. Their licence named them as end user. Your exposure is allocation and price, and possibly what their end-use commitment says about US customers | Ask what share of their feedstock is Chinese and how much cover they hold | They source feedstock outside China and can evidence it |
| Finished components made in China that contain these elements (GaN chargers, IR camera modules, flame-retarded plastics) | Shipped as a product, not a listed material | Low under Article 2 as written, because packaged products are not on the item lists | Confirm the customs code your supplier exports under. Anything shipped as a wafer, die, blank or powder is a listed form | It is clearly a finished assembly under a finished-goods code |
| Any channel where the end use is US military | Anywhere | Already banned under Article 1. Nothing changes on the 27th | If any plan relied on the pause for defense work, it was never covered. Stop and re-plan | Never |
The row people underrate is the frame agreement. A spot buyer finds out on 28 November whether a shipment is stuck. A frame-agreement buyer often finds out in February, when the first 2027 call-off needs a licence that was never applied for, and the 45-working-day review clock (more on that below) has not even started.
We have seen this more times than we can count, and it rarely starts with anything dramatic. The product description in our own ERP does not match what legal submitted to the authorities. An HS code differs between two documents, or the unit of measure does. A certificate of conformity and a certificate of origin disagree on a detail nobody would notice until a customs officer does, and the same can happen with any paper the supplier or carrier sends. The fix is almost always to resubmit the documents, and that alone usually delays clearance by at least a couple of weeks. Under a licence regime the stakes go up, because the licence has to match the shipment, and every one of those small mismatches is a reason it might not.
Which contract clauses decide who eats the cost?
Pull the contract for every exposed row above and read these clauses before you call the supplier. The Chinese side’s position will be simple: a refused licence is a government act and they are excused. Whether you are left with a remedy depends on your paper.
| Clause | What usually decides it | How it plays if the pause lapses | What to ask or change now |
|---|---|---|---|
| Force majeure | Whether “government action”, “export restriction” or “licence refusal” is a listed event, and whether the clause excludes events foreseeable at signing | The supplier will invoke it. The 27 November end date has been public since 9 November 2025, so a contract signed after that is arguably exposed to a foreseeability argument | Ask counsel whether foreseeability is in play on contracts signed after 9 Nov 2025. Get the supplier’s position in writing before the 27th, not after |
| Export-licence condition | Whether the seller must obtain the licence, or only apply for it with reasonable efforts | “Apply” means a refusal ends the obligation without breach | Add a notification deadline (seller tells you within days of a refusal or a request for more documents) and an explicit right to buy cover elsewhere |
| End-user certificate and no-transfer commitment | Under the 2024 regulations the end user commits not to change the end use or transfer the item to a third party without MOFCOM’s permission | Your certificate names a site and a use. Moving material to another plant, or reselling it, may need permission | Inventory which of your sites and uses each certificate names. Do not move licensed material between plants without checking |
| Price or index clause | Fixed price, or an index, and which index (China domestic or Western) | The China-to-West price gap widens again. A seller outside China on a China-indexed price will want out | Check which index your price references and whether there is a reopener |
| Allocation or priority clause | Whether you have any allocation right at all when the seller’s licensed volume is short | Licensed US-bound volume becomes the scarce thing, not metal | Ask where you sit in the supplier’s allocation if licences are partial |
| Delivery term (EXW, FCA, FOB China) | Where risk and title pass relative to Chinese export clearance | Under EXW, goods stuck before export clearance can be yours and stuck | Move EXW lines to FCA or FOB so the seller carries the export-clearance risk, where the seller will accept it |
| Change in law | Whether it allows price reopening, suspension or termination | Article 2 coming back is a textbook change-in-law event | Decide now whether you want the termination right or the reopener, because you may only get to use one |
The 2024 regulations add one detail most buyers miss. A licence application has to include the contract itself and the end-user and end-use certificate (Dual-Use Items Export Control Regulations, Article 16). So the supplier’s application is only as good as the paperwork you sent them. A certificate with the wrong site name, an old legal entity or a vague end use is a delay you caused.
Will licences already issued keep working after November 27?
We do not know, and neither, as far as we can find, does anyone outside MOFCOM. Announcement No. 72 has one operative sentence and no transition clause. It says nothing about licences granted during the pause.
What the regulations do say is that MOFCOM can tell an exporter to stop using a licence while it reviews whether the facts it relied on have materially changed, and can then withdraw or revoke it (Article 18). A policy reversal toward one destination is the kind of change that power could be used for. It may also be left alone, with existing licences allowed to run out on their own terms. We would treat an existing licence as good until the supplier is told otherwise, ship against it as early as possible, and not sign anything that assumes it survives into 2027.
The other mechanics matter more than people expect:
- A single licence covers one export to one end user and is valid for at most a year. A general licence allows multiple shipments to one or more end users and runs up to three years, but only for exporters with a working compliance system and an export track record (Articles 15 and 16).
- Changing the end user, destination or end use means a new application and a pause in exports under the old licence (Article 18). If your plan B is “ship it to our Mexican plant instead”, that is a new licence, not a re-route.
- Review takes up to 45 working days from acceptance, and time spent on expert review or on-site verification of the exporter or end user does not count toward it (Article 17). Items with a major bearing on national security go to the State Council and are not bound by the 45 days at all.
How much inventory should we pull forward, and is it already too late?
For anything that still needs a new licence, it is already too late to beat the date. Forty-five working days is about nine calendar weeks before verification time is added, and an application filed on November 20 would not be decided until late January at the earliest. What you can still pull forward this week is narrow: material already covered by a licence that names you, physically ready to ship, that can clear Chinese export customs by the 27th.
Beyond that, the question becomes how much cover to hold while you find out which way the policy goes. Our tariff inventory playbook makes the general argument that buffer stock is a loan against a guess, and the same logic applies here with one difference. A tariff makes material more expensive. A presumption of denial can make it unavailable at any price through the direct channel, which makes the cost of being short much larger than the carrying cost for most production inputs.
So the arithmetic leans toward holding more, for the short list of SKUs where a stockout stops a line. The exceptions are high-value, slow-moving materials where months of cover ties up serious cash, and grades with shelf-life or contamination limits. For sizing the cover, our rule is lead time multiplied by variability. For a material we already buy, we use the variability we have actually seen on it. For a new material, or a new source, we use the variability we predict. The pause ending stretches the lead time in that sum for anything that needs a new or amended licence, since the review clock alone can run 45 working days. We are not putting a number of weeks on it here, because the right figure depends on your own lead times and history.
There is also a signal in the trade data. Chinese customs figures compiled by RAWMATERIALS.net and summarised by Gallium Sales put China’s gallium exports at 2,030 kg in September 2026, up from 350 kg in August but below the 5,000 kg of September 2025, with germanium at 573 kg. Gallium Sales’ own sum for January to September is about 32 tonnes. Exports that small tell you that legal permission and actual flow were never the same thing, even during the pause.
What about buying through Japan, Korea or Europe instead?
It works for genuinely non-Chinese material and is a legal risk for Chinese material passing through. Announcement No. 46 ends with a sentence saying organisations and individuals in any country or region that transfer or provide China-origin items to US organisations in violation of its provisions will be held legally liable. Once Article 2 is back in force, that sentence covers it again.
On top of that, the 2024 regulations require the end user to commit not to transfer the item to a third party without permission (Article 24). A trader in Osaka or Frankfurt that imported Chinese gallium under its own end-user commitment has, in effect, promised MOFCOM where it goes. Selling it on to a US buyer puts that trader’s own licence relationship at risk, which is why we expect most reputable traders to refuse, ask for a large premium, or ask you to certify a non-US end use you cannot honestly give.
The flows show buyers already reaching for that channel. In the same September data, Japan took 1,000 kg of China’s gallium exports, Vietnam 830 kg and Malaysia 200 kg, while Germany took nothing for a second month (Gallium Sales). We are not suggesting any of those shipments ended up in the US. The point is that a buyer who switches to a third-country trader on November 28 should ask the origin question first and the price question second.
Real diversification means a non-Chinese refinery or recycler, evidenced by certificates, under a separate supply agreement. That takes qualification time, which is the honest reason to start now even if the pause gets extended next week. Our supplier audit checklist covers what procurement can verify on a new source without a quality engineer in the room.
What should we watch between now and January 10?
Watch the MOFCOM policy index for any notice naming Announcement No. 72, every day up to and including the 27th. Last year the suspension notices came at the last minute, and a notice published on the 26th or 27th Beijing time could land while US teams are at Thanksgiving dinner.
After that, the dates stack up. China’s monthly customs data, around the 20th of each month, shows whether US-bound shipments of these materials move at all. The G20 in Miami in mid-December is the next likely Trump-Xi meeting. And 10 January 2027 is when the six October 2025 notices, the wider truce and much of the US side’s matching relief all come due together, so a buyer who survives the 27th still has another cliff six weeks later.
If an extension does land before the 27th, keep the work. Every contract you sorted, every licence number you collected and every clause you read is still the exposure sheet for the next deadline. The difference is that you will be the buyer who already has it.
The step we would add this week is one buyers tend to skip until afterwards, which is getting in touch with other customers of the same supplier and comparing notes on licences, paperwork and what the supplier has told each of you.
Frequently asked questions
When does China’s suspension of the gallium, germanium and antimony export ban to the US end?
On 27 November 2026, under MOFCOM Announcement No. 72 of 2025. If no extension is published, the presumption of denial for US-bound licences applies from 28 November Beijing time, which is the morning of 27 November in the eastern United States.
Was the gallium suspension extended with the rare earth suspension on November 9?
No. MOFCOM and Customs Announcement No. 58 of 2026 extended the suspension of six October 2025 control announcements to 10 January 2027. It does not mention Announcement No. 72, and as of 20 November no separate extension had been published.
Does China still require export licences for gallium and germanium to other countries?
Yes. Licences have been required for every gallium and germanium export since 1 August 2023, and for antimony since 15 September 2024, whatever the destination. The November 27 date only changes how US-bound applications are treated.
Are finished products containing gallium, such as GaN chargers, covered?
Not under the item lists as written. They name gallium metal, compounds, wafers and epitaxial wafers rather than packaged devices. Check the customs code your supplier exports under, because a bare wafer or die is much closer to a listed form than an assembled product.
Can we buy Chinese-origin gallium through a trader in Japan or Europe instead?
It carries real risk. Announcement No. 46 says anyone in any country who transfers China-origin items to US organisations in violation of its provisions faces legal liability, and end users must commit not to transfer licensed items to third parties without permission. Non-Chinese material with refinery certificates is the clean route.
